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Abstract— This paper presents a watermarking signal injec-
tion method that compensates its effect in the loop, avoiding
thus the signal reinjection. Similar to a virtual actuator scheme,
the proposed methodology masks the presence of the authen-
tication signal to the system controller, that do not need to
be retuned as it remains immunized. Furthermore, a set-based
analysis concerning the effect that the performance loss imposed
by a watermarking signal has in the detectability of a replay
attack is performed for the stationary, assuming that a standard
state observer is used in order to monitor the plant. Finally, a
numerical application example is used to illustrate the proposed
approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) consist of both, logical and
physical elements connected by communication channels.
The advantages in efficiency and adaptability that CPSs entail
have led to its successful implementation in different sectors
like water and gas supply systems, smart grids or transporta-
tion networks among others. Nevertheless, their capability
to integrate and coordinate heterogeneous components also
imply the introduction of new security weaknesses that could
be exploited by a malicious attacker[1]. Registered attacks
like [2], [3] have demonstrated the severe consequences that
planned attacks against critical infrastructures may imply to
society.
In [4], malicious cyber attacks are classified as either
denial-of-service (DoS) or deception attacks. While DoS at-
tacks consist in blocking the communication between system
components (sensors, actuators and/or controllers), deception
attacks provoke that one, or several, system components
receive false information and believe it as true, being there-
fore harder to detect. Among the different deception attacks
considered in the literature [5], replay attacks appear as one
of the most common and natural ones to be launched by an
attacker who does not have any a priori knowledge of the
system dynamics, but is aware that the system itself will be
in steady state during the attack [6]. For the replay attack
considered in this work, it is assumed that: 1) a malicious
attacker secretly records a time slot of the sensing data sent
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to a monitoring station; 2) the recorded data is replayed back
in order to mask a physical attack conducted over the plant.
Security in control systems is not a new topic of study,
and the problem of fault diagnosis and fault tolerant control
has been thoroughly studied in the literature. Despite the
resemblances between the attack detection and fault diagno-
sis problems, replay attacks have shown to be undetectable
by means of standard fault detection algorithms (in [6] the
authors have shown the replay attack undetectability by some
statistical detectors, like the χ2 detector). From a consistency
based point of view, fault diagnosis techniques analyze the
given I/O pair (U, Y ) together with a nominal plant behavior
reference, in order to detect, isolate and estimate the fault [7].
However, when a replay attack substitute the actual measure-
ments by previously recorded ones (Ȳ ), data consistency is
preserved, achieving to deceive fault detection schemes. As
consequence, it seems necessary to modify the system inputs
with the inclusion of an authentication signal (∆U ), in order
to analyze the new sensor measurements (Y ′) checking for
the time-dependent injected signal. Nevertheless, this comes
at the cost of introducing a performance loss that separates
the new system outputs (Y ′) from the nominal ones (Y ).
The aforementioned detection techniques are placed within
the watermarking-based approach. Some of the authentica-
tion signals proposed in the literature in order to detect
replay attacks are: In [6], an independent and identically
distributed (IID) Gaussian distribution is used to generate the
authentication signal; the watermark proposed in [8] aims
at destabilizing the residual while preserving the stability
of the main system; in [9] the authors employ a periodic
watermarking strategy; in [10], a sinusoidal signal with a
time-varying frequency is proposed as possible signature; and
in [11] a multi-agent extension of the watermarking concept
is presented. It must be remarked the introduction of alter-
native methods (see [12]) which, under certain assumptions,
propose replay attack detection techniques without injecting
an exogenous signal in the control inputs.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: 1) The introduc-
tion of a novel methodology for injecting a watermarking
signal such that, based on virtual actuator (VA) schemes,
compensates its effect in the system outputs with the aim
to avoid the reinjection in the loop, and thus immunizing
the system controller that do not need to be retuned; 2) The
development of a robust study using set-based techniques,
with the purpose of characterizing for the stationary the re-
lationship between the required system outputs performance
loss, and the detectability of the replay attack if a classical
state observer is used in order to generate the residual set.
This study is carried out under the assumption of closed-loop
state feedback.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows:
Section II describes the proposed method for injecting a
watermarking signal without affecting the controller. In Sec-
tion III, a robust analysis of the performance loss induced
by a watermarking signal is carried out using a set-based
approach. Section IV presents a numerical example in order
to demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach. Finally,
the main conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. WATERMARKING SIGNAL INJECTION
In this section, a design mechanism for injecting a wa-
termarking signal without affecting the predefined system
controller is proposed.
A. Formulation
Let us consider a discrete-time linear time-invariant (LTI)
system
xk+1 = Axk +Buk
yk = Cxk
(1)
where u ∈ Rnu is the input vector, y ∈ Rny the output
vector, x ∈ Rnx is the state vector, and A, B, C are the state-
space matrices of appropriate dimensions. A square system
is assumed in this work, i.e. nu = ny . The control objective
is to regulate the plant tracking error
z = x− xr (2)
where the reference signal xr satisfies the reference model1
x+r = Axr +Bur
yr = Cxr
(3)
The defined tracking error is stabilized by means of a
control action of the form
u = f(z, yr) (4)
being yr the imposed set-point.
In order to force the detection of a malicious attack
affecting system (1), a watermarking signal ∆u is added
through the system inputs u. With this purpose, let us
consider a new set of states xα that depend on the plant
outputs y as follows
x+α = y +Bαd = Cx+Bαd (5)
where d ∈ Rny is an exogenous signal and Bα is an input





, systems (1) and (5) can be gathered
together as




1Henceforth, the index k+1 will be replaced by + and k will be omitted





















Furthermore, let us consider another input matrix for
system (5) with the form: B?α = 0, such that the control
of the new plant can only be exerted by means of system
(1) outputs. Under this consideration, the dynamics of the






















resulting in an under-actuated control system, i.e. the equi-
librium points of the new system (5), are imposed by the
equilibrium points of system (1). According to this limitation,
a virtual actuator scheme [7] may be used for adding a signal
∆u to the nominal control action (4) (yielding a new control
signal u′ = u+ ∆u), such that, alters the system (1) outputs
for stabilizing the states xα in a desired set point.
Note that, if the pair (A,B) is controllable and if
rank(C) = ny , then, the pairs (A2, B2) and (A2, B?2) are
controllable for any matrix Bα, as A2 is only dependent on
the system (1) states.
Similar to VA schemes, the imposed rank loss in the input
matrix
rank(B?2) < rank(B2) (10)
motivates the use of a new dynamics system, called differ-
ence system, in order to control the under-actuated system
(8). This yields a new control action u′2
u′2 = Nu2 +Mx∆ (11)






2 the pseudoinverse of B
?
2 . The dynamics of the
difference system x∆ are given by
x+∆ = (A2 −B
?
2M)x∆ + (B2 −B?2N)u2
y∆ = C2x∆
(13)
with the matrix M designed such that (A2 − B?2M) is a







































i.e. the new control action u′ injected to the original system
(1), is now extended with the addition of ∆u = M ′x∆.
According to (14), the dynamics of the difference system
(13) are only actuated by means of the externally imposed
signal d as
x+∆ = (A2 −B
?







































therefore, by adding the outputs y∆ to the system outputs
y′ (see Fig. 1), the dynamics of the complete reconfigured
system, as seen from the controller point of view, can be
modeled (defining x̃ = x′2 + x∆) as
x̃+ = A2x̃+B2u2 (18a)
y = C2x̃ = C2x
′
2 + C2x∆ = y
′ + y∆ (18b)
that has the same dynamics as system (6), and hence the
dynamics of the original plant (1).
B. Injected signal
According to (18b), by imposing a watermarking signal d
that affects the difference system outputs y∆, the same effect,
but with opposite sign, will be produced in the plant outputs
y′ through the addition of the derived ∆u = M ′x∆ control
signal.
The advantage of injecting the authentication signal d
following the proposed scheme is that the system controller
will not notice the addition of the new control action ∆u.
Therefore, no controller retuning is needed in order to cope
with the reinjection of the watermark signal in the control
loop. This methodology can be perceived as a plug & play
mechanism [13] allowing to include a watermarking signal
in an already defined control loop.
Throughout the rest of the paper, the considered authenti-
cation signal will be a random switch in the system set-point
y′r, by modifying its components between the values







where yr,i represents the desired value in the ith system
output imposed by the nominal system controller (4), and δyi
represents the set-point offset forced by the authentication
signal ∆u. This is done in order to achieve attack detectabil-
ity when a temporal mismatch between the expected and the
measured output is produced as a consequence of an attack.
The imposed set-point offset, denoted as ∆yr =
[δy1, · · · , δyny ]T , is therefore obtained by injecting an exter-
nal signal d such that forces the desired offset (with opposite
sign) in the difference system outputs y∆.
Remark: The selection of the previous authentication sig-
nal is motivated in order to link with performance loss
Fig. 1. Watermarking signal injection scheme
analysis developed in the following section. Nevertheless, the
same procedure holds if more complex watermarking signals
are injected, remaining the controller immunized in any case.
III. SET-BASED REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, set-based approaches (that has been suc-
cessfully applied to the FDI problem [14]) are used in order
to robustly analyze the performance of classical detectors,
under the presence of a replay attack, as a function of the
performance loss introduced by a watermarking signal.
This performance loss must be understood, element by
element, as the set-point difference ∆yr that exist between
the set reference when the signal was recorded by a malicious
attacker ȳr,i, and the imposed output reference yr,i when
the attack is being deployed, i.e. when the recordings ȳi are
replayed back by substituting the real sensor measurements
yi.
As shown in Fig. 1, the considered replay attack is as-
sumed to affect only the measurements sent to an anomalies
detector. Furthermore, the presence of a stabilizing low-level
feedback control loop is also assumed throughout the present
section.
A. Preliminaries
For the following development, the discrete-time LTI sys-
tem (1) is extended by considering the presence of process
disturbances w and measurement noise v, resulting in a
system with the form
x+ = Ax+Bu+ Eww
y = Cx+ Evv
(20)
Moreover, both, process and measurements noise, are
assumed to be unknown but bounded
W = {w ∈ Rnx : |w − cw| ≤ w̄, cw ∈ Rnx , w̄ ∈ Rnx}
V = {v ∈ Rny : |v − cv| ≤ v̄, cv ∈ Rny , v̄ ∈ Rny}
(21)
where cw, w̄, cv and v̄ are constant vectors, and the inequal-
ities in (21) are considered component-wise.
The sets expressed in (21) can be rewritten using a
zonotopic representation [15] as
W = 〈cw, Rw〉
V = 〈cv, Rv〉
(22)
where cw and cv denote the centers of the disturbance and
noise bounding zonotopes respectively, with their respective
generator matrices Rw ∈ Rnx×nx and Rv ∈ Rny×ny .
Hereinafter it will be assumed that disturbance and noise
are bounded by a unitary hypercube zonotopes centered at
the origin
W = 〈0, Inw〉
V = 〈0, Inv 〉
(23)
where Inw ∈ Rnw×nw and Inv ∈ Rnv×nv denote the identity
matrices.
In order to regulate the tracking error with respect the
reference model (3), a linear fixed gain feedback control
action is considered
u = ur + v = ur −Kz (24)
By taking into consideration (20) and (3), the tracking error
dynamics are defined as
z+ = Az +Bv + Eww = (A−BK)z + Eww (25)
with K designed such that (A−BK) is a Schur matrix. The
dynamics (25) represent a stable LTI system with bounded
additive disturbances (23). Thus, a zonotopic representation
Z of the robust positive invariant (RPI) set for z can be
defined as (see [16])
Z = 〈cz∞ , Rz∞〉 (26)
where cz∞ and Rz∞ are computed by recursively propagating
the zonotopic set
czj+1 = (A−BK)czj
Rzj+1 = [(A−BK)Rzj Ew]
(27)
starting from the initial zonotope Z0 = 〈cz0 , Rz0〉 that
belongs to the RPI set which could be calculated by means of
any of the developed procedures (e.g. Ultimate Bound [17]).
The zonotopic representation (27) will converge to a smaller
RPI set in the steady state, i.e., when j →∞.
B. Residual generator
The studied detector consists on the classical residual
construction used in the FDI community
r = y − ŷ (28)
where y represents the vector of measured outputs, subject to
a replay attack, and ŷ = Cx̂ represents the output estimation.
The monitoring of the plant system (20) can be done by
designing a Luenberger observer of the form
x̂+ = Ax̂+Bu+ L(y − ŷ) (29)
where x̂ is the state estimation and the observer gain L is
computed such that (A− LC) is a Schur matrix.
Denoting x̃ = (x − x̂) as the state estimation error,










Similar to the tracking error dynamics (25), the system
(30) represents a stable LTI system with bounded additive
disturbances (23). Therefore, a zonotopic representation X̃
of the RPI set for the estimation error x̃ is denoted as
X̃ = 〈cx̃∞ , Rx̃∞〉 (31)
where cx̃∞ and Rx̃∞ are computed as the stationary values,
i.e. j →∞, of the propagating zonotopic set
cx̃j+1 = (A− LC)cx̃j + cw − Lcv
Rx̃j+1 = [(A− LC)Rx̃j Ew − LEv]
(32)
starting from the initial zonotope X̃0 = 〈cx̃0 , Rx̃0〉 belonging
to a RPI set.
1) Healthy functioning: For the healthy functioning, i.e.
when no attack is performed over the plant outputs, the
residual set has the form
rH = y − ŷ = Cx+ Evv − Cx̂ = Cx̃+ Evv (33)
Thus, projecting the zonotopic representation of the RPI
sets associated to the measurements noise (23) and the
estimation error (31), into the healthy residual space, the
zonotopic representation of a RPI healthy residual set is
obtained as
RH = 〈crH , RrH 〉 (34)
with
crH = Ccx̃∞ = 0
RrH = [CRx̃∞ Ev]
(35)
Note that the size of the remaining residual set is
dependent on the selection of the observer gain L.
2) System under replay attack functioning: Whenever a
subset l (l ⊆ m |m = {1, ..., ny}) of the system outputs is
substituted by previous recordings, i.e. ∀i ∈ l ⇒ yi = ȳi,
yielding a new output vector ȳ, then, the monitoring observer
(29) looses the stabilizing loop being its dynamics governed
by two independent and bounded inputs (u, ȳ).
If the error between the system state x̄ that would yield
the substituted outputs ȳ and the estimated state x̂ is taken
under consideration, then, the residual set may be expressed
as
rA = ȳ − ŷ = Cx̄+ Evv − Cx̂ = Ct+ Evv (36)
where t = x̄− x̂.
The dynamics of this new estimation error system are
t+ = x̄+ − x̂+ = Ax̄ + Bū + Eww − (Ax̂ + Bu + L(ȳ − ŷ))
= (A− LC)t + B(ū− u) + Eww − LEvv
(37)
with
ū = ūr −Kz̄ u = ur −Kz (38)
denoting ∆ur = ūr − ur, then
t+ = (A−LC)t+B∆ur−Kz̄+Kz+Eww−LEvv (39)
The previous equation represents an LTI system with
bounded additive disturbance, by using (23) and (26) the
zonotopic representation of the RPI set for the previously
defined estimation error during the attack may be expressed
as
T = 〈ct∞ , Rt∞〉 (40)
where ct∞ and Rt∞ are computed as the stationary values,
i.e. j →∞, of the following propagation zonotopic set
ctj+1 = (A− LC)ctj +B∆ur
Rtj+1 = [(A− LC)Rtj −BKRz∞ BKRz∞ Ew − LEv]
(41)
starting from, the initial zonotope T0 = 〈ct0 , Rt0〉 belonging
to a RPI set.
Projecting the previous zonotopic representation of the
estimation error RPI set (40), in the attacked residual space
defined in (36)
crA = Cct∞ = C(I − (A− LC))−1B∆ur (42a)
RrA = [CRt∞ Ev] (42b)
Note that, under the assumption that system matrix A has
no integrating modes, equation can be used (3) to express
the difference in the reference set-point ∆yr = ȳr − yr as




the expression (42a) can be reformulated as
crA = C(I − (A− LC))
−1B∆ur
= C((I −A)−1 − (I − (A− LC))−1LC(I −A)−1)B∆ur
= (I − C(I − (A− LC))−1L)∆yr
(45)
Comparing the derived healthy and attack residual gener-
ator matrices, it can be seen that the size of the obtained RPI
attack set is bigger that the healthy one. This conservatism
is consequence of the independence between the injected
control input u and the measured control output ȳ during
the attack. According to that, replay attack may be detected
even without forcing a performance loss in the system.
Equation (45) shows how the difference between the set-
point of the replayed signal ȳr and the set-point imposed
through the control action yr, shifts the center of the attack
2Equality derivation:
I −A = (I − (A− LC))− LC
(I − (A− LC))−1(I −A) = I − (I − (A− LC))−1LC
(I − (A− LC))−1 = (I −A)−1 − (I − (A− LC))−1LC(I −A)−1
residual set. The previous difference may be achieved by
randomly switching the system reference between predefined
values. Note that the center displacement of the RPI attack
set, given an obtained ∆yr, follows some directions imposed
by the system dynamics and the monitoring observer gain L.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Let us consider a discrete time LTI system, see (20), with




























and a sample time Ts = 1s.
The previous system is assumed to be controlled by means















1) Watermarking signal injection: The procedure devel-
oped in Section II is used in order to switch the system
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and the system set-point is randomly switched between
points separated
∆yr = [δy1, δy2]
T = [0.5, 0.75]T (51)
around the point ynom = [3, 2]T .
Figure 2 shows the plant outputs response to the injected
watermarking signal. It also shows (in green), the system
outputs as seen from the controller point of view which are
immunized to the injection of the authentication signal.
2) Replay attack: It is assumed that an attacker has
hijacked the sensors and secretly records sets of sensor mea-
surements in the stationary. The considered record windows
are (in orange in Fig. 2): ȳ1 constitutes the record of output
1 from t10 = 250s to t
1
f = 350s and ȳ2 the record of output
2 from t20 = 500s to t
2
f = 575s. At some point in time
(t1init = 1150s, t
2
init = 1275s), the attacker replays in loop
the previous recording, as shown (also in orange) in Fig.
3. This figure represents how at some random moment, the
system set-point switches, causing a mismatch between the
injected control action and the system measurements.






























Fig. 2. Watermarking signal injection





























Fig. 3. Replayed measurements
3) Residual analysis: Figure 4 shows the zonotopic rep-
resentation of the healthy residual RPI set as well as the
attack residual RPI sets when a reference mismatch appears
in the first output ∆yr = [δy1, 0]T , in the second output
∆yr = [0, δy2]
T or in both outputs ∆yr = [δy1, δy2]T at the
same time.
The computation of these sets is performed offline and
provides beforehand information regarding if the introduced
∆yr = [δy1, δy2]
T assures attack detection (attack sets not
intersecting the healthy set), and attack isolation (attack sets
neither intersecting among them). Note that for the selected
∆yr = [0.5, 0.75]
T values, the conditions of detectability
and isolation are fulfilled.
Related with the temporal attack evolution shown in Figure
3, Figure 4 shows how after a transient stage the computed
residuals stabilize within the healthy (blue), first output
Fig. 4. Healthy/attacked residual sets
(green) and both outputs (yellow) attacked sets, respectively.
No residuals stabilize within the second output attacked set,
as the second system output never is attacked alone.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced a novel methodology for inject-
ing a watermarking signal without affecting the predefined
system controller, by exploiting the well-known VA scheme.
Besides, a set-based analysis concerning the replay attack
detectability as a function of the performance loss imposed
by an authentication signal, is developed for the case that
a state observer is used in order to monitor the plant. The
computation of the optimal observer gain such that maxi-
mizes the attack detectability while minimizing the required
performance loss is a future research direction.
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